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 Explaining individual differences in linguistic proficiency 
Ewa Dąbrowska 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The vast majority of the 14 commentaries are thoughtful and constructive and raise a 
variety of important points. Due to space limitations, I will not be able to respond to 
all the points in as much detail as they deserve. Some of the apparently critical 
remarks, I believe, are due to misunderstanding. I therefore begin my response by 
clarifying some issues. I then discuss some alternative explanations of the data 
suggested by the commentators, including the possibility that the results described in 
the keynote article are attributable to performance factors, and respond to 
commentators who disagree with the central claim of the keynote article, viz., that 
there are substantial individual differences in adult native speakers‟ knowledge of the 
grammar of their language. I conclude by discussing some broader issues and 
suggestions for further research.  
 
SOME CLARIFICATIONS 
 
1. Education-related differences are not “the whole story” 
 
 Several researchers point out that education-related differences “cannot be the 
whole story” (Sekerina this issue: XX). Sekerina also warns about the third variable 
problem, and  Hadley and Rispoli point out that some of the observed differences in 
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grammatical knowledge may be due to biological factors. On a related note, Schulz 
finds the concept of educational background “irritatingly vague”, and argues that most 
of the differences described in the keynote article are group, rather than individual, 
differences, while Reuland points out that the low academic attainment (LAA) label 
applies to individuals with very different abilities.  
 All of these observations are fully compatible with views expressed in the 
keynote article. I never claimed that education was “the whole story”, or even a 
significant causal factor. The studies described in the article used education 
(operationalized as the number of years of schooling) as a grouping variable. Possible 
causes were discussed in the section on reasons for individual differences, and include 
environmental factors such as the amount and quality of linguistic experience as well 
as learner-internal factors, including IQ, language aptitude, and need for cognition 
(the degree to which an individual enjoys effortful cognitive ability).  
 It is also worth pointing out that not all of the constructions discussed in the 
keynote article showed education-related differences. Those that did, however, all 
followed the same pattern: highly educated participants performed at ceiling; less 
educated participants varied in ability, with performance ranging from chance (and, in 
some cases, below chance) to ceiling. Thus, we are dealing with both group and 
individual differences.  
 
2. Explicit instruction is not necessary for learning  
 
Serratrice points out that explicit instruction is not necessary for learning. I 
did not argue that it is – only that it may be helpful, at least for some constructions. 
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What I suggested may be necessary is that the learner attend to both form and 
meaning at the same time – and explicit explanation may facilitate this.  
Serratrice also points out that the training in the Street and Dąbrowska (2010) 
study involved explicit instruction as well as exposure to the trained construction in a 
disambiguating context, so we don‟t know whether the improvement in performance 
was a result of teaching, exposure, or a combination of the two, and she suggests that 
the study should have had an additional control condition: exposure to the trained 
form in a disambiguating context, but without explicit instruction. Until this 
manipulation is performed, Serratrice argues, we cannot be sure what caused learning. 
This is absolutely correct; however, the purpose of the study was not to investigate the 
role of explicit instruction in learning, but simply to determine whether learning 
would occur at all.  
 
3. The existence of individual differences does not entail that the UG hypothesis 
is false 
 
Phillips observes, correctly, that the existence of individual variation does not 
constitute an argument against Universal Grammar, and concludes that the main 
argument in the paper is a non-sequitur. However, I did not claim that the existence of 
individual differences in language attainment entails that the UG hypothesis is false: 
all I said is that it undermines one of the arguments for UG, namely the convergence 
argument. I am nonplussed at how Phillips arrived at his interpretation of my 
argument, since the keynote article states very clearly that  
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“The results summarised here suggest that the convergence argument [for 
Universal Grammar] is based on a false premise: there are, in fact, 
considerable differences in how much speakers know about some of the basic 
constructions of their native language. This does not necessarily mean that 
Universal Grammar does not exist: one can argue in favour of innate 
constraints on language learning on other grounds, for instance, poverty of the 
stimulus.” (XX) 
 
Phillips also argues (again, correctly) that whether or not different learners are 
exposed to different input is irrelevant to the convergence argument: “If learners 
consistently reach the same conclusions based on the same input utterances …. then it 
suggests that there are constraints on the conclusions that they draw” (XX). Yes – if 
they consistently reach the same conclusions – but this is precisely what is at issue!  
 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
 
Reuland suggests that the results reported in the keynote article could be 
accommodated by appealing to Avrutin‟s (2006) notion of “weak syntax”, originally 
developed to explain the performance of Broca‟s aphasics. According to Avrutin, the 
syntactic component in Broca‟s aphasics is unimpaired but weak; this results in 
slower processing, and, consequently, patients often resort to nonsyntactic means 
when processing utterances. Thus, Broca‟s aphasics‟ “weak syntax” is supposed to 
account for not just agrammatic comprehension of structures like passives, but also 
their slow, effortful and telegraphic speech.  
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 There are a number of problems with Reuland‟s proposal. He does not explain 
why syntax should be “weak” in speakers who have not suffered brain damage. 
Furthermore, while some LAA participants have relatively poor comprehension, their 
spontaneous production is not like that of aphasics. Related to this, there is no 
evidence of an across-the-board impairment in morphosyntactic knowledge in these 
speakers: they merely have problems with some specific constructions. Last but not 
least, it is not clear how the “weak syntax” hypothesis could accommodate the results 
of the training studies. Reuland suggests that training enhances automatization and 
hence the speakers‟ syntax becomes stronger. This is extremely implausible: 
automatization is a slow process, and is thus unlikely to have occurred during a five-
minute training session involving just six exemplars of the target construction.  
Reuland also suggests that the relatively poor performance observed in some 
participants in the Polish dative study may be explained by lack of lexical rather than 
morphological knowledge: the participants, he argues, may know the structure of the 
paradigm, but just lack the knowledge that the masculine singular dative ending is 
-owi, the neuter ending is -u, etc. However, such an explanation cannot account for 
the observed results (see Dąbrowska 2008). The Polish participants do know what the 
dative ending are, as they readily supply them with real words as well as some nonce 
words. They are also able to correctly identify the gender of nonce nouns. What they 
lack is the knowledge that the same ending applies across-the-board to all nouns 
belonging to a particular class – i.e., knowledge about the structure of the paradigm. 
Vainikka and Young-Scholten suggest that the differences observed in 
Polish speakers‟ knowledge about the genitive could be attributable to differences 
between spoken and written language: the grammars of more educated participants 
may conform to the norms of written Polish, while those of the less educated 
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participants may reflect spoken language. Two points need clarifying here. First, the 
differences observed in the genitive study were not education-related: all the 
participants were students from the same class in the same school, and thus had the 
same level of education and similar social backgrounds. Education-related differences 
were found for the Polish dative; these however, are not attributable to different 
norms for spoken and written language, because exactly the same rules operate in 
both varieties.  
 
THE COMPETENCE/PERFORMANCE DISTINCTION   
 
Several commentators observe that evidence for grammatical competence is 
always indirect, and emphasize the need to exercise caution when interpreting 
experimental results. Sekerina and Phillips point out that children who fail on tasks 
tapping knowledge of a particular construction sometimes succeed when tested using 
a different method. Adults tend to be less sensitive to task differences; however, 
Sekerina and Phillips are right to insist that the results described in the keynote article 
should be replicated using different methods. Note that this has already been done for 
the passive, and the results of the different studies (Dąbrowska and Street 2006, Street 
and Dąbrowska 2010, in press) are very similar; however, further research is clearly 
required with other constructions.  
Schulz points out that it is important to rule out the possibility that participants 
didn‟t understand the task, and also suggests that the poor performance on implausible 
sentences in the Dąbrowska and Street (2006) study may be explained by pragmatic 
factors. The first objection is unjustified: as explained in the article, the LAA 
participants performed at ceiling in control conditions. The second point is valid; 
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however, pragmatics cannot explain the differences in performance on implausible 
actives and passives. Note, too, that later studies showed similar results with 
reversible sentences.  
Phillips makes a similar point, but draws stronger conclusions. He contends 
that the evidence that I present bears on participants‟  “type (ii) knowledge”, i.e. their 
“skill or efficiency at constructing specific representations or interpretations” (XX), 
rather than “type (i) knowledge”, i.e., the representations that a speaker can construct. 
In other words, he seems to be arguing that the difficulties that some participants 
experienced in the studies described in the article are facts about performance, and 
hence irrelevant to claims about linguistic competence. Reuland seems to hold an 
even more radical view when he asserts, bizarrely, that “chance behavior indicates 
that [speakers] know the rules but cannot always apply them” (XX3). 
 One entire section of the keynote article was devoted to arguing that the 
observed differences must be at least partly attributable to differences in competence. 
Phillips and Reuland are clearly not convinced by it. What they do not state in their 
contributions is what would count as evidence about “type (i) knowledge”: they 
appear to believe that performance data can never be used to falsify claims about 
competence.  
 The problem, of course, is that – since competence cannot be tested directly – 
our only evidence about it comes from studies of performance.  As is well known, 
performance can be affected by grammatically irrelevant factors such as attention or 
cooperativeness; but the solution is to design experiments which control for such 
confounds, rather than giving up the commitment to linguistics as an empirical 
science.   
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ACQUISITION BY FIAT 
 
 Several commentators disagree with the central claim of the keynote article, 
namely, that there are substantial differences in individual speakers‟ knowledge about 
their language. Roeper objects that I do not provide “a single example of an 
alternative grammar that speakers arrive at”, or even evidence that speakers respond 
consistently, arguing that “if another grammar were present, we would expect 
consistent alternative behavior” (XX1). I must begin by pointing out that I do, in fact, 
provide an example of alternative grammars: for the Polish genitive singular 
inflection, it is clear that different speakers have different rules (some use -a with all 
masculine nouns; some use -a with animates and -u with inanimates; and some have 
more specific rules based on either semantic or phonological criteria). However, it is 
true that most of the examples discussed in the keynote article involved a different 
situation, namely, cases where individual speakers‟ grammars are arguably 
incomplete, that is to say, lack a particular rule or principle (as opposed to divergent, 
i.e., containing a different rule or principle – cf. Sorace 1993). The reason for this is 
that when speakers‟ grammars are different, this may be due to dialect differences – 
and it is very difficult to demonstrate that a particular variant is not associated with a 
particular language variety, be it social or stylistic. Roeper asserts that in order to 
demonstrate alternative grammars, I would need to demonstrate “consistent 
alternative behaviour”. This is simply incorrect: if one speaker‟s grammar lacks a 
construction, rule or constraint that is present in another speaker‟s grammar, then they 
have different grammars. Note, too, that in L2 research, inconsistent performance is 
regarded as the  hallmark of incomplete acquisition. 
 9 
 Roeper also suggests that the low academic attainment participants‟ 
performance could have been affected by “personality variables linked to social 
class”, and that “it might be that education affects a person‟s „grammaticality 
judgment attitude‟ skewing the results in one direction or another without revealing a 
grammatical difference” (XX1). It is not clear what relevance the last point has for the 
research described in the keynote article, since none of the studies actually used 
grammaticality judgments. But let‟s assume for the sake of argument that personality 
affects performance on inflection tasks and grammatical comprehension tasks. It is 
still not clear why personality variables should affect performance on passives, 
sentences with quantified NPs, and nouns from high-density neighbourhoods, but not 
actives and other constructions which were used in the control conditions. 
Furthermore, I fail to see how personality variables linked to social class could 
explain the change in performance after training observed in Street and Dąbrowska 
(2010) and Chipere (2001) – unless a five-minute training session can have lasting 
effects on personality. Most importantly, Roeper cannot simply dismiss a whole raft 
of studies by asserting that some unspecified personality variables might have 
affected performance: he needs to make some concrete and falsifiable statements 
about what these personality variables might be, how they affect performance, and 
why they affect some constructions but not on others.  
 Finally, Roeper asserts that I use some “extremely indirect and obscure 
correlational claims” to “argue for the superiority of one group – once again educated, 
wealthier people – over others” (XX). I will leave it to readers to decide for 
themselves whether my claims are indeed “extremely indirect and obscure”; they are 
certainly not purely correlational (the two training studies discussed in the paper were 
true experiments). And I am certainly not arguing for the superiority of the richer and 
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more  educated: as explained in the keynote article, the LAA participants were able to 
learn the relevant constructions very quickly when given appropriate input.  
 I would also like the world to be a fair place and everybody to have equal 
opportunities. Unfortunately, this is not the case – as demonstrated by the work on 
socio-economic status and brain development reviewed by Pakulak.  Roeper‟s 
attempt to claim the moral high ground by denying the existence of the differences 
described in the article is not only scientifically questionable; it is also socially 
irresponsible, since the evidence suggests that we can do a great deal to help less 
privileged children (cf. Neville et al. 2011, Hackman and Farah 2009, Hackman et al. 
2010).  
 Schulz takes a rather different tack. She begins by discussing four possible 
scenarios:  
(1) speakers of different regional varieties have somewhat different grammars; 
(2) a particular speaker may have two different grammars (e.g. for the standard 
and the regional variety); 
(3) different speakers may have different variants of a particular rule; and  
(4) some speakers may lack a particular rule.  
Scenarios (1) and (2) are not relevant to the discussion, since the research described in 
the keynote article dealt with differences between speakers that could not be 
explained by appealing to dialect differences: for instance, it is not the case that The 
boy was kissed by the girl means „The girl kissed the boy‟ in some dialects of English 
and „The boy kissed the girl‟ in other dialects. Schulz acknowledges that scenarios (3) 
and (4) could be real, but suggests such a state of affairs would demonstrate that the 
relevant speakers simply have a minimally different grammar rather than a grammar 
that is impoverished or incomplete. In other words, she appears to accept the central 
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claim of the keynote article – the existence of individual differences in speakers‟ 
knowledge of core grammatical constructions (although she claims that such 
differences are quite small) – but denies incomplete acquisition, arguing that a 
grammar that lacks a particular rule is “equally complete” (XX2). 
  Can a grammar that lacks a particular rule be regarded as “equally complete” 
and merely simpler, and possibly more elegant? There is a sense in which this is a 
reasonable suggestion: a two-bedroom house is a complete house with two bedrooms 
– not an incomplete version of a three-bedroom house. On the other hand, there is a 
real sense in which a grammar that does not allow speakers to correctly interpret 
passive sentences or simple sentences with quantifiers can be regarded as incomplete. 
A second language learner who has not mastered the passive construction would be 
uncontroversially regarded as having incomplete mastery of English grammar. There 
is no principled reason for applying different criteria to native speakers. 
 
BROADER ISSUES 
 
Several commentators point out that it is important to spell out what exactly 
the low-performing participants do not have. For instance, with respect to the results 
on the comprehension of passives, Reuland makes the following observation:  
 
“There is no such thing as a „passive rule‟. The formation of passives in English 
involves at least three independent rules/processes: case suppression for the 
object, suppression of the external thematic role, and movement of the object into 
the subject position…. Hence, any claim about non-acquisition of passives should 
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be specified as a claim about a specific subprocess involved in passives, and be 
tested against the consequences it predicts.” (XX1)  
 
It is clear from this passage that Reuland confuses reality with a particular theoretical 
account of it. In some versions of generative grammar, the formation of passives 
involves case suppression for the object, movement, etc.; but non-derivational 
theories account for passives in a very different way. In Construction Grammar, for 
instance, the passive is considered a construction (i.e., a form-meaning pairing) in its 
own right, not something that is derived by transforming a structure with an active-
like word order.  
 Different theories will make different predictions about what other 
constructions may be affected in individuals who have not mastered the passive, and 
Reuland is absolutely right that these predictions need to be spelled out explicitly. But 
the purpose of the keynote article was not to determine whether Construction 
Grammar accounts for the facts better than Minimalism, or vice versa, but to establish 
that individual differences exist – the necessary first step to subsequent investigations 
of relationships between structures. For this reason, I have tried to describe the results 
in a maximally atheoretical way. Adherents of various frameworks can easily 
formulate alternative hypotheses about what exactly the low-performing individuals 
have not acquired.  
 Sekerina and Schulz both suggest that we should go beyond merely 
documenting differences and attempt to determine their causes. I couldn‟t agree more: 
but the first step is to establish that such differences do exist – as demonstrated by 
some of the comments, this is still controversial. Future research will need to 
investigate the reasons for individual differences much more rigorously, examine the 
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interrelationships between cognitive, affective, and environmental factors, and 
determine whether specific factors affect different constructions in different ways. As 
Schulz points out, there is a large number of studies on individual differences in SLA 
which could serve as models for such research.  
  One particular area which is likely to be particularly rich in theoretical 
implications is the effect of literacy on language development. Vainikka and Young-
Scholten point out that the grammars of literate L2 learners may be fundamentally 
different from those of naturalistic learners. The research reviewed in the keynote 
article suggests that analogous differences may be found in the grammars of L1 
speakers. Several commentators offer supporting evidence. Birdsong reviews a 
number of studies suggesting that good readers process spoken language faster and 
more accurately; and Sparks points out that L1 print exposure predicts both L1 and 
L2 achievement.  
 Hulstijn makes a similar point, arguing that we need to distinguish between 
basic and non-basic language. The former includes core grammatical constructions 
and vocabulary items shared by all unimpaired native speakers and relies on the 
Language Acquisition Device, while the latter also implicates higher cognitive 
processes and is not shared by all speakers.  
While it would certainly be useful to know which aspects of language are 
shared by (nearly) all native speakers and which are not, establishing the contents of 
„Basic Language Cognition‟ will be very difficult in practice. It is not clear, for 
example, how one could provide a non-circular definition of language impairment, or 
what would count as mastery of a particular construction – would we require 
consistent correct performance, or would a speaker who performed just above chance 
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also qualify? The basic/nonbasic distinction will almost certainly turn out to be a 
matter of degree rather than a strict dichotomy.  
Even more problematic is the suggestion that “non-basic” aspects of language 
rely on different cognitive abilities. As Ellis points out, basicness is at least to some 
degree a function of frequency: the most frequent constructions are likely to be 
mastered by all learners. True, frequency itself depends on factors such as salience, 
functionality, and complexity, but it is also partly a matter of linguistic convention:  in 
some languages (e.g. French), the basic word order within the noun phrase is noun-
adjective, with adjective-noun available as a marked (i.e., nonbasic) variant, while in 
others (e.g. Polish), the opposite is the case.  
 DeKeyser raises several points connected with age effects in acquisition. He 
suggests that the existence of variability in L1 does not undermine the critical period 
hypothesis, but rather helps to explain some findings which at first appear to be 
problematic for the CPH. High-aptitude late L2 learners do very well on some tests 
because they rely on explicit knowledge; therefore, DeKeyser argues, second 
language researchers interested in age effects should “avoid structures for which quite 
a bit of variability has been documented; otherwise it is a foregone conclusion that the 
ranges of L1 and L2 variation are going to overlap” (XX3). Three points immediately 
come to mind in connection with this observation. First, it is not a foregone 
conclusion that the ranges of variation are going to overlap: if a structure is so 
difficult that even native speakers struggle with it, it would not be unreasonable to 
expect it to be unlearnable by most L2 learners. Secondly, DeKeyser‟s 
recommendation to avoid structures which are variable even in L1 makes sense if the 
purpose of one‟s inquiry is to demonstrate the existence of critical period effects. But 
if the purpose of our inquiry is to understand the nature of L1 and L2 speakers‟ 
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knowledge, then clearly we must look at both types of structures. Last but not least, 
given that there are considerable differences in native speakers‟ performance on fairly 
basic grammatical structures, there may not be very much left to study if we avoid 
those structures for which there is variability! 
 DeKeyser also observes that “critical period” effects are most likely to show 
up on tasks tapping implicit/procedural knowledge and processing. However, it is 
very difficult to determine whether the differences are due to age effects per se, or to 
proficiency. Comparing non-native speakers with native speakers who are matched 
for linguistic proficiency may shed light on this issue. One recent study which did this 
(Pakulak and Neville 2011) found different ERP responses in native and non-native 
speakers, which would support DeKeyser‟s position. However, it is clear that more 
research is required. Pakulak and Neville tested very simple phrase structure 
violations in NPs (*at my his farm); it remains to be seen whether similar effects are 
observed for more complex constructions.  
 If consistent performance is regarded as the hallmark of proceduralized 
knowledge (cf. Paradis 2009), then the variable performance observed in low 
academic attainment L1 speakers suggests that not all first language grammatical 
knowledge is proceduralized, at least not in all speakers. Furthermore, as pointed out 
in the keynote article, there are considerable differences in age of acquisition of non-
basic constructions in L1: some learners may know all there is to know about the 
passive by age 4, while others may not master the construction until late childhood or 
adolescence – or never master it.  
This raises an interesting question: if an L1 learner acquires a particular 
construction relatively late in development, is her representation of this construction 
more like that of second language learners than like that L1 learners who mastered it 
 16 
early? As Pakulak points out, while adult linguistic attainment correlates with 
education, early experience may explain more variance. This would have important 
consequences for work on critical period effects, as well as obvious social and 
educational implications.  
 This again suggests that the differences between L1 and L2 knowledge and 
processing may be a matter of degree. Language comprehension and production, even 
in native speakers, involves a combination of highly automatic and more effortful, 
controlled processes (Novick et al. 2005, Ye and Zhou 2009); interpreting the same 
construction may rely primarily on automatic processes in some speakers, and 
primarily on controlled processes in others (cf. Novick et al. 2005). Thus, differences 
between L1 and L2 speakers may amount to differences in the number of 
constructions that they have proceduralized. Future research on ultimate attainment, 
whether in the first or second language, will need to allow for variation not just 
between speakers, but also between constructions. Grammars are patchworks of 
constructions, not monolithic blocks.  
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